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RELATIONSHIPS AND RETALIATION IN THE #METOO ERA
Nicole Buonocore Porter*
Abstract
In this #MeToo era, so much important work is being done (and so
many stories are being told and listened to), but very little of the work
focuses on retaliation. And none of the work focuses on situations where
the fear of retaliation is not necessarily job loss (although that certainly
happens) but rather, it is the fear of harming workplace relationships. This
Article will use a real-life story of harassment to demonstrate how much
workplace relationships matter—especially to women—and how the fear
of harming those relationships often affects an employee’s willingness to
report harassment. Thus, this Article argues for reforms surrounding
harassment and retaliation law that recognize this reality. Right now,
courts penalize victims of harassment for not reporting harassment soon
enough because they feared harming their workplace relationships; or,
when they do report, courts penalize them by holding that the
relationship-based harm they experienced after reporting was not a real
harm worthy of a remedy. These courts reason that reasonable employees
would not and should not be deterred from reporting harassment because
they fear relationship-based harms. And yet, most of the empirical
evidence shows that the opposite is true: reasonable employees
(sometimes men, but especially women) often do avoid reporting because
they fear harming their relationships in the workplace. The law should
reflect this reality.
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INTRODUCTION: NINA’S STORY
This is a true story about a friend who experienced harassment and
stayed silent. This friend (Nina) was also a lawyer. Nina was working as
an in-house lawyer for a manufacturing company, handling the labor and
employment work of the entire company. This company had about
twenty-five plants across the country. Her “clients” were the human
resources (HR) personnel at all of the plants and the headquarters, where
Nina worked. She was new to this in-house job, and she knew that she
needed to work hard at establishing good relationships with the clients;
otherwise, when a problem arises at a plant, the HR manager would either
forego getting legal advice at all or would use an outside lawyer, wasting
company resources.
Nina spent the first couple of months traveling to several plants,
meeting as many HR managers as possible to get to know them, to talk
about the plant’s employment issues, and to offer her services. On one of
these visits she met a man (John), who was an HR regional manager in
charge of HR for eight other plants (i.e., HR managers at those eight
plants reported to John). Nina knew it was important to make a good
impression. She met John over dinner and drinks with the plant’s HR
manager and a couple of other managers from the plant. John was friendly
to the point of being flirtatious, and as the night wore on, the flirtation
seemed to cross the line into advances. Nina assumed John’s excessive
drinking explained his behavior and she did not really let it bother her too
much. She traveled back home the next morning and put it behind her.
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Two months later, Nina traveled to another state where the company
was having a weekend-long retreat for all of the HR managers in the
company. This was going to be a great opportunity for Nina to meet the
HR managers that she had not already met and to establish herself as an
employment law expert and a team player.
On the first night of the retreat, those who had already arrived (about
ten people, including Nina) were having drinks outside on the patio of the
hotel. John was one of those people and seemed to pick up right where
he left off two months earlier. He was much more brazen this time. He
kept leaning over to whisper in Nina’s ear the graphic sexual things he
wanted to do to and with her. He also kept putting his hand on her knee
or thigh. Nina tried to ignore him, but John was relentless. In addition to
the graphic statements whispered in her ear and the touching, he kept
trying to get her to walk down to the beach with him. Others at the table
could tell something was not right. One of the female HR managers
caught Nina’s eyes and quietly asked if she was okay. Nina assured her
she was fine.
Because what were her choices? She could tell John off, privately or
loud enough for the others to hear. She could just get up and leave. Or
she could do nothing. She chose to do nothing, other than to constantly
move John’s hand off her knee and repeatedly tell him “no” in response
to every one of his crude comments or suggestions. Nina chose to do
nothing because the other choices possibly involved harming her
relationships with these clients. She was embarrassed by his attention and
did not want the other HR managers thinking that she had done something
to bring it on or that she was overly sensitive or “uptight.” She already
had a sense of the culture at this company. These people worked hard,
played hard, and were very thick-skinned. Generally, Nina was too. She
thought that raising a stink about John’s behavior would contradict the
impression she wanted them to have of her.
And, just as importantly, she was worried about offending John by
calling him out on his boorish behavior. Because if she angered him, she
knew there was a strong likelihood that he would not only stop using her
legal services, but he would convince the HR managers that he supervised
to stop calling her too. Nina knew that her relationships with these people
were important.
This is also why Nina did not tell the other lawyer when he arrived at
the retreat or the director of HR, who was John’s boss. She also did not
say anything to the general counsel (Nina’s boss) when she returned
home after the retreat. She thought long and hard about saying something.
Nina knew that John’s behavior was inappropriate and bordered on
violating the law, and even though she knew she could handle the
situation, she was nervous about seeing him again (especially if there
were not plenty of other people around). Nina also knew that John could
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be a liability risk for the company. Even though she had no intention of
suing, if John was doing this to her, he was possibly (maybe likely?)
doing it to others who might sue the company. Her job as an in-house
lawyer was to minimize the company’s employment risks. And yet she
still said nothing.
Why? Because Nina imagined the reaction, especially of the HR
director but possibly of the general counsel or the other lawyers in the
department, and it was not good. Knowing the culture of this company,
Nina was fairly certain that they would think that she was overreacting
and being a whiny troublemaker, or they would think she was not cut out
to work in a male-dominated manufacturing environment. Someone who
rocked the boat like this was not someone they would respect. Nina was
also worried about what everyone would be thinking or saying about her
if (really, when) her complaint became public knowledge. Nina was
raised as a people pleaser, and she believed one of her strongest assets
was her ability to get along with others. The chance that several people
would be mad at her for complaining, or the possibility of them talking
about her behind her back, was unthinkable and anxiety producing.
So she stayed quiet, even though she knew better. Two years later,
when she had decided to leave for another job, she found out from the
HR director that John had made advances at a company picnic towards
the wife of one of the plant managers, and he was fired for it. At this
point, Nina felt it was safe to tell the HR director what had happened to
her two years earlier. He asked her why she had not said anything before,
and she responded with a question: “What would you have thought about
me if I had brought this complaint to your attention?” He just laughed and
agreed she had made the right decision not to say anything at the time.
So what is the point of this story? The point is that if you have not
experienced harassment and feared retaliation, it is hard to understand
why harassment victims do not come forward, even when the feared
retaliation is not termination.
This Article argues that workplace relationships matter (especially to
women) and demonstrates how the fear of harming those relationships
often affects an employee’s willingness to report harassment. Thus, this
Article argues for two reforms surrounding harassment and retaliation
law that recognize this reality.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces the problem.
Specifically, it argues that reporting levels of harassment are very low in
large part because victims of harassment fear retaliation. This Part then
introduces the legal rules for sexual harassment and retaliation. It also
explains the catch-22 that the law surrounding these two doctrines
creates: if harassment victims wait too long to report the harassment, they
might lose their harassment claim, but if they complain too early and are
retaliated against, they will likely lose their retaliation claim.
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Part II then turns to the specific focus of this Article, which is
relationship-based harm. It discusses social science literature and
provides caselaw examples where the retaliation a plaintiff is claiming is
some type of relationship-based harm, such as being ostracized in the
workplace. It also explains how “cultural” (or “relational”) feminism
helps to explain why women are much more likely than men to be worried
about relationship-based harms.
Finally, Part III provides a two-part proposal. First, the affirmative
defense for harassment claims should be amended to allow plaintiffs to
survive summary judgment when they delay reporting harassment
because of fear of harming their workplace relationships. Second, the
retaliation doctrine should be expanded to consider relationship-based
harms as “adverse employment actions.”
I. EXPLAINING THE PROBLEM
The #MeToo movement has told a narrative that is not quite true. This
narrative is that women are reporting harassment at a much higher rate
than ever before, and that they are doing so without penalty.1 That might
be true for high-profile Hollywood types2 who shared their stories to have
them heard3 and not to necessarily seek a remedy in the workplace.4 But
reporting harassment against a current supervisor or coworker is fraught
1. See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Essay, Ending Harassment by Starting with Retaliation,
71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 49, 49 (2018), https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/
sites/3/2018/06/71-Stan.-L.-Rev.-Online-Porter-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8Y6-7Y7E].
2. Cf. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Beyond #MeToo, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1146, 1173 (2019)
(noting that women whose abusers are not famous would have a hard time getting the media to
listen to their stories); Lesley Wexler et al., #MeToo, Time’s Up, and Theories of Justice, 2019 U.
ILL. L. REV. 45, 53 (noting that public shaming might not help those who are not in positions of
power or in the public eye). To be clear, even Harvey Weinstein’s victims of harassment avoided
reporting for many years, in part because he threatened to destroy their reputations if they spoke
out. Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Legal Implications of the MeToo Movement, 103 MINN. L. REV.
229, 234 (2018).
3. See Jessica A. Clarke, The Rules of #MeToo, 2019 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 37, 41 (stating that
the originators of the #MeToo movement saw it as a “‘therapeutic, restorative, and educational’
effort” (quoting Lesley Wexler, #MeToo and Law Talk, 2019 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 343, 345));
Tuerkheimer, supra note 2, at 1174 (noting the benefits of the #MeToo movement as catharsis,
validation, and solidarity).
4. See Clarke, supra note 3, at 46–47 (“[I]ncapacitating and deterring high-level harassers
only assists a privileged pool of potential victims, and only in a limited set of
circumstances . . . . Survivors without fame and fortune are less likely to find investigative
journalists eager to tell their stories.”); Porter, supra note 1, at 49, 51–52; Wexler et al., supra
note 2, at 51 (noting that Alyssa Milano’s #MeToo movement was not intended to be a call for
action and was more of an attempt to get the public to understand the prevalence of harassment
and assault and to enhance the believability of victims); id. at 54 (stating that the naming and
shaming campaign does not solve the issue of workplace protections for victims).
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with risk and often brings little reward for one very simple reason—
retaliation.5
A. Fear of Retaliation Leads to Low Reporting Rates6
For an employer to stop and remedy harassment, the victim of the
harassment needs to report it.7 And yet, by all accounts, reports of
harassment are very low.8 Despite the fact that in one study, four in ten

5. Porter, supra note 1, at 50; see also Tuerkheimer, supra note 2, at 1166 (stating that
most victims of harassment often end up worse off after reporting and that it thus is actually
unreasonable for them to report); Carly McCann & Donald T. Tomaskovic-Devey, Nearly All
Sexual Harassment at Work Goes Unreported—and Those Who Do Report Often See Zero
Benefit, CONVERSATION (Dec. 14, 2018), http://theconversation.com/nearly-all-sexualharassment-at-work-goes-unreported-and-those-who-do-report-often-see-zero-benefit-108378
[https://perma.cc/BR9T-GXV3] (stating that the #MeToo and #TimesUp movements have
brought renewed attention to workplace sexual harassment but the vast majority of allegations go
unreported and those who do report tend to face troubling outcomes). In fact, as noted by Professor
Brake, the fact that #MeToo has bolstered the credibility of women complaining about sexual
harassment is not likely to reduce retaliation and might even make it worse because many people
think that the #MeToo movement has gone too far. See Deborah L. Brake, Coworker Retaliation
in the #MeToo Era, 49 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 2 (2019).
6. This Section is derived in part from Porter, supra note 1, at 51–52.
7. Obviously, some harassment is so open and notorious that the employer might be aware
of it without a complaint by the victim. But generally speaking, victims need to report harassment
before employers can remedy it. See Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Risk of Complaining—Retaliation,
38 J.C. & U.L. 1, 36 (2011) (“Of course, if the victims of discrimination do not complain,
discrimination is likely to continue unchecked.”); Joanna L. Grossman, Moving Forward, Looking
Back: A Retrospective on Sexual Harassment Law, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1029, 1031 (2015) (stating
that only when someone names, blames, and claims harassment will anything be done about it);
Anne Lawton, The Bad Apple Theory in Sexual Harassment Law, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 817,
846 (2005) (stating that many courts assume that the employer is powerless to stop harassment
unless employees report it); cf. Vicki Schultz, Open Statement on Sexual Harassment from
Employment Discrimination Law Scholars, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 17, 39 (2018),
https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2018/06/71-Stan.-L.-Rev.-OnlineSchultz-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/V972-XDDN] (“Discouraging victims from reporting not only
robs them of relief . . . [but] also deprives employers . . . of the victims’ view of what harassment
is.”).
8. U.S. EEOC, SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE:
REPORT OF CO-CHAIRS CHAI R. FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC 15 (2016); Anne Lawton,
Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and Faragher Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 197, 208 (2004) (stating that reporting harassment is a “very uncommon
occurrence” (quoting Bonnie S. Dansky & Dean G. Kilpatrick, The Effects of Sexual Harassment,
in SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND TREATMENT 152, 158 (William O'Donohue
ed., 1997))); Lawton, supra note 7, at 847 (describing the very low reporting rates of harassment);
McCann & Tomaskovic-Devey, supra note 5 (stating that about “[five] million people experience
sexual harassment at work every year, yet on average only around 9,200 file a charge with the
EEOC or [the state equivalent],” which amounts to 99.8% of people who do not file a charge).
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women stated they experienced harassment in the workplace,9 the number
who reported this harassment is much, much lower.10 For instance, one
study revealed that although 44% of those who experienced harassment
at work took no action, only 12% reported the conduct.11 Another study
revealed that large employers receive only six complaints per year, about
.02% of employees.12 Instead, most victims ignore incidents of
harassment or take costly steps to avoid the harasser or the job.13 In fact,
of all of a victim’s responses, the most infrequent is to report.14
The reason for this low rate of reporting is because victims of
harassment fear all types of retaliatory actions,15 including, as described
9. Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form Over
Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 5 (2003).
10. Id. at 23 (“Sexual harassment victims have traditionally tended not to utilize internal
complaint procedures or otherwise formally report problems of harassment.”).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 24; see also Lawton, supra note 8, at 208 (citing several studies of very low reports
of harassment: 2–6% in one study, 13.3% in the private sector and 6% in the university setting in
another study, and other studies indicating a low of 5% and a high of 18%).
13. Kimberly M. Cummings & Madeline Armenta, Penalties for Peer Sexual Harassment
in an Academic Context: The Influence of Harasser Gender, Participant Gender, Severity of
Harassment, and the Presence of Bystanders, 47 SEX ROLES 273, 274 (2002) (stating that the most
common responses to harassment are to ignore it or avoid it and that reporting it is the least
common response); Grossman, supra note 9, at 25; see also U.S. EEOC, supra note 8, at v (stating
that harassment victims tend to avoid the harasser, deny the significance or seriousness of the
harassment, ignore it, or endure it); Lilia M. Cortina et al., What’s Gender Got to Do with It?
Incivility in the Federal Courts, 2002 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 235, 259 (stating that, in a study of
mistreatment suffered by attorneys (much of it gender-related), most attorneys ignored, denied,
or minimized the mistreatment).
14. Grossman, supra note 9, at 26; see U.S. EEOC, supra note 8, at 15 (“[T]he extent of
non-reporting is striking.”); Lawton, supra note 8, at 208 (discussing the underreporting problem);
see also U.S. EEOC, supra note 8, at 17 (“[I]n many work environments, the most ‘reasonable’
course of action for the victim to take is to avoid reporting the harassment.”); Shereen G. Bingham
& Lisa L. Scherer, Factors Associated with Responses to Sexual Harassment and Satisfaction
with Outcome, 29 SEX ROLES 239, 240–41, 247 (1993) (stating that employees seldom report
harassment and that formal and informal complaints were the least likely used responses to
harassment); Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., Why Didn’t She Just Report Him? The Psychological and
Legal Implications of Women’s Responses to Sexual Harassment, 51 J. SOC. ISSUES 117, 121
(1995) (stating that the most infrequent response to harassment is to seek organizational relief).
15. U.S. EEOC, supra note 8, at 16 (stating that many victims of harassment never report it
because they anticipate social retaliation, including humiliation and ostracism); Grossman, supra
note 9, at 51 & n.294 (citing Mary P. Rowe, People Who Feel Harassed Need a Complaint System
with Both Formal and Informal Options, 6 NEGOT. J. 161, 164 (1990)) (referring to an estimate
based on personal experience that indicated that 75% of victims express serious concerns about
retaliation); see also Cortina et al., supra note 13, at 259–60 (stating that the primary reason
lawyers participating in the study did not report mistreatment “was fear—of harming their clients’
cases, damaging their professional image, losing favor with the judge,” and work-related
retaliation); Fitzgerald et al., supra note 14, at 122 (stating that many victims do not report because
they fear retaliation, as well as fear not being believed and being humiliated); Anne Lawton,

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 5 [], Art. 7

804

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

more below, being ostracized by coworkers.16 Social science research
“consistently has shown that women do not report (or delay reporting)
harassment because they fear retaliation, they believe no one will believe
them, or they think reporting will make the situation at work worse.”17
This fear of retaliation in all forms is not unfounded.18 In fact, studies
demonstrate that employees who report harassment often face adverse
consequences, including termination.19
But employers do not even need to retaliate to deter reports.
Retaliation performs most of its work simply by being threatened
(explicitly or implicitly).20 As Professor Deborah L. Brake notes,
“[d]ecisions about whether to challenge discrimination rest on a careful
balancing of the costs and benefits of doing so.”21 Women who choose
not to report harassment do so because they believe that the costs of

Between Scylla & Charybdis: The Perils of Reporting Sexual Harassment, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 603, 604–05 (2007) (discussing how fear of retaliation stops victims from reporting).
16. L. Camille Hébert, Why Don’t “Reasonable Women” Complain About Sexual
Harassment?, 82 IND. L.J. 711, 731, 741 (2007) (describing employees’ fear of how their
coworkers would treat them after reporting harassment); Lawton, supra note 15, at 621
(discussing the fact that after the author reported harassment by one of her more senior colleagues,
the silence inside the department was “deafening”); see also U.S. EEOC, supra note 8, at 16
(separating out professional retaliation that affects the job directly and “social retaliation,” such
as being ostracized).
17. Lawton, supra note 15, at 618–19.
18. Lawton, supra note 8, at 258 (stating that the fear of retaliation is “not baseless”); see
also Rebecca Walker, Mitigating the Fear of Retaliation: Helping Employees Feel Comfortable
Reporting Suspected Misconduct, J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE, Mar.–Apr. 2008, at 19, 20
(stating that one in eight employees experience some form of retaliation for reporting suspected
misconduct).
19. Grossman, supra note 9, at 52; see Lawton, supra note 8, at 266. A 2003 study indicated
that 75% of those who reported harassment experienced retaliation. U.S. EEOC, supra note 8, at
16. Although this is merely anecdotal evidence, the Author found it interesting that in the
harassment stories that the EEOC discussed in the Task Force report, all of them involved the
harassment victim being retaliated against. Id. at 3–5; see also Mindy E. Bergman et al., The
(Un)reasonableness of Reporting: Antecedents and Consequences of Reporting Sexual
Harassment, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 230, 237 (2002) (finding in their study that reporting triggers
retaliation and causes victims harm); Bingham & Scherer, supra note 14, at 263 (stating that filing
formal or informal complaints did not resolve the harassing situation); Fitzgerald et al., supra note
14, at 122 (stating that 62% of workers who reported harassment experienced retaliation,
including lower job evaluations, denial of promotions, and being transferred or fired); Hébert,
supra note 16, at 740 (stating that women are not unreasonable for fearing negative consequences
from reporting harassment because negative consequences often occur and those who complain
often get evaluated more negatively); McCann & Tomaskovic-Devey, supra note 5 (stating that
the low proportion of employees who file sexual harassment claims is likely a function of
employers’ punitive responses where two-thirds of those employees will lose their jobs).
20. Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 39 (2005).
21. Id. at 36.
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reporting outweigh the benefits.22 As is discussed more below,23 the
organizational culture of an employer greatly influences how much of a
role retaliation plays in that organization.24
B. Harassment Claims
To bring a successful harassment claim under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,25 the plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that the
harassment was because of a protected trait; (2) that the harassment was
unwelcome; (3) that it was severe or pervasive so as to create an abusive
work environment; and (4) some basis for establishing employer
liability.26
Before elaborating on the employer liability issue (which is often the
hardest element for plaintiffs in harassment claims), this Article analyzes
Nina’s potential harassment claim. Because Nina’s experience involved
sexual comments and overtures, it certainly would be considered
“because of sex.” Based on the facts, it seems obvious that Nina did not
“welcome” the harassment, but some courts would use the fact that Nina
did not explicitly tell John to stop as evidence that the harassment was
not unwelcome.27 Assuming Nina could prove that the harassment was
unwelcome, proving the severe or pervasive element is likely difficult for
Nina. The first incident of harassment was strictly verbal. The second
time John harassed Nina, there was some “touching,” but it was not the
type of touching that would normally be considered “severe”—he had his
hand on her knee or thigh but he did not grope her private parts. 28 It is
unlikely that even the two instances together would be considered
pervasive.29 Thus, even before getting to the employer liability issue, it is
22. Id. at 36–37.
23. Infra Section III.B.
24. See Brake, supra note 20, at 39–40; see also Walker, supra note 18, at 20 (stating that
where employees have a fear of retaliation, the employer’s compliance program suffers).
25. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 704, 78 Stat. 241, 257 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e3 (2012)).
26. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (describing the severe or
pervasive standard); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66–68, 72 (1986).
27. See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 829–30 (1991) (stating that
courts use women’s silence to demonstrate that the harassment was not unwelcome, but the silence
is usually attributable to shame, humiliation, fear, and dependence of the victim).
28. See, e.g., Gerald v. Univ. of P.R., 707 F.3d 7, 18 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that one
incident where the supervisor grabbed plaintiff’s breast was sufficient to meet the standard). But
see Clarke, supra note 3, at 43 (“Some courts have held that even repeated instances of unwanted
sexual touching do not count as harassment.”); Tippett, supra note 2, at 241 (stating that some
scholars have highlighted cases where even egregious harassment was found not to meet the
severe or pervasive standard).
29. See Estrich, supra note 27, at 842, 846 (discussing how courts have a difficult time
judging pervasiveness from a woman’s perspective); id. at 846 (“[T]he objective standard of
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unclear whether Nina would have an actionable harassment claim had she
chosen to bring one.
Moving on to the fourth element of the harassment claim, even when
the harassment claim is otherwise actionable—it is because of a protected
trait, unwelcome, and severe or pervasive—the plaintiff still must
establish that the employer should be held liable for the harassment
perpetrated by its employees.30 Employers are not automatically liable for
the harassment of their employees.31 Whether the employer can be held
liable is determined through different tests depending on whether the
harasser is a supervisor or a coworker.32
If the harasser is a coworker (or a customer, client, or other third
party), the test for determining whether the employer will be held liable
is one of negligence—whether the employer knew or should have known
about the harassment and failed to take appropriate steps to remedy it.33
As should be obvious from this, if the employee who was harassed does
not report the harassment, then it is unlikely that the court will hold that
the employer should have known about the harassment, unless it was so
open and notorious that everyone knew about it.34
For instance, in our Nina story, John would not be considered Nina’s
supervisor;35 he would be considered a coworker or maybe even a client.
Thus, the employer would only be liable if it failed to take appropriate
action after Nina reported. Because Nina never reported, the employer
could not have been expected to take remedial actions. And if Nina did
report and the employer took some reasonable measure to remedy the
harassment (such as giving John a warning or making sure that John is
not left alone with Nina), the employer would not be liable for the
harassment. This is true even if Nina suffered some mental anguish or
anxiety from the harassment, and this is true even if the employer’s
remedy interfered with her ability to work with John and the HR
managers he supervised.

pervasiveness is defined by an idealized woman who simply may not exist. Such a woman is
tough, not ‘hypersensitive’; she is aggressive, not passive . . . . In short, the ‘reasonable woman’
is very much a man.”).
30. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
31. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72; see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804 (preserving Meritor’s
holding on this point).
32. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803 (discussing the differences between supervisor harassment
and coworker harassment); see also Tippett, supra note 2, at 238 (same).
33. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799; see also Grossman, supra note 9, at 8 (noting that the
standard for coworker harassment is one of negligence).
34. See Grossman, supra note 9, at 50 (noting that, if victims do not complain about
harassment, employers will not be able to remedy it).
35. For the definition of “supervisor,” see infra note 36.
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If the harasser is a supervisor,36 unless the supervisor takes a “tangible
employment action”37 against the victim, the employer has the
opportunity to establish a two-part affirmative defense: “(a) that the
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”38
The first prong is all about the employer: the employer must show that
it took reasonable steps to prevent and correct harassment. 39 The
prevention part of this is usually very easy for employers to meet. As long
as employers have and disseminate an anti-harassment policy that gives
employees multiple avenues to report the harassment, employers will
likely be able to demonstrate reasonable steps to prevent harassment.40
Training employees and supervisors on the harassment policy also helps,
but is not strictly necessary.41 The correction part of the first prong
requires the employer to take reasonable steps to remedy harassment after
36. The United States Supreme Court defined “supervisor” in Vance v. Ball State Univ.,
570 U.S. 421 (2013), as someone who is “empowered by the employer to take tangible
employment actions against the victim,” id. at 450. See also Grossman, supra note 7, at 1042
(stating that Vance omits the consideration of “supervisors” who dictate many or all of a worker’s
daily working conditions but lack the ultimate power over the worker’s job).
37. A “tangible employment action” is described as “discharge, demotion, or undesirable
reassignment.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808.
38. Id. at 807; see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (applying
the same two-part affirmative defense).
39. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (stating that although “proof that an employer had
promulgated an antiharassment policy with a complaint procedure is not necessary in every
instance as a matter of law,” the need for one is important to the first element of the defense).
40. See, e.g., Lauderdale v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 512 F.3d 157, 164 (5th Cir.
2007) (stating that the employer satisfied the first prong of the affirmative defense “by virtue of
its institutional policies and educational programs regarding sexual harassment”); see also
Grossman, supra note 9, at 10, 12 (noting that employers can prove prevention fairly easily
through having an adequate policy be distributed and appropriate training).
41. See, e.g., Lauderdale, 512 F.3d at 164 (noting with approval the employer’s training
programs for sexual harassment); Grossman, supra note 9, at 13 (noting that training is not
specifically required but can be a factor in favor of demonstrating that the employer was
reasonable in its prevention efforts). But see Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a
Poor Substitute for a Pound of Cure: Confronting the Development Jurisprudence of Education
and Prevention in Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 4, 29–30,
35, 38 (2001) [hereinafter Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention] (discussing the fact that, even
though courts use training programs as evidence of employers’ prevention efforts, there is actually
a dearth of research indicating that training programs are successful in preventing harassment);
Susan Bisom-Rapp, Sex Harassment Training Must Change: The Case for Legal Incentives for
Transformative Education and Prevention, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 62, 68 (2018) [hereinafter
Bisom-Rapp, Training Must Change], https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/
3/2018/06/71-Stan.-L.-Rev.-Online-Bisom-Rapp.pdf [https://perma.cc/VPW6-DGGC] (stating
that sexual harassment training programs, “as generally practiced, do[] not prevent harassment”).
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it is reported to them.42 Obviously, employers do not always succeed in
proving this, but as long as they take some reasonable steps to stop the
harassment after it is reported to them, they should be able to succeed on
this prong.43
The second prong is all about the plaintiff: the employer has to prove
that the plaintiff failed to take advantage of preventive opportunities or
to otherwise avoid harm.44 If the plaintiff delays reporting, the employer
will likely win on this prong of the affirmative defense.45
For instance, in Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp.,46 the plaintiff was
harassed by her supervisor on March 13, June 12, June 13, June 17, and
June 18.47 She reported the harassment on June 20.48 The court held that
the delay was unreasonable despite the fact that the plaintiff reported
shortly after the harassment had started escalating.49 In another case, the
court held that even seventeen days was too long to delay reporting.50
Notably, even if employees delay reporting because they are at a new job
42. See, e.g., Lauderdale, 512 F.3d at 165 (stating that the employer promptly investigating
the plaintiff’s allegations of harassment and disciplining the harasser were sufficient actions to
satisfy the employer’s first prong of the affirmative defense).
43. See, e.g., Conatzer v. Med. Prof’l Bldg. Servs., Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1270 (N.D.
Okla. 2003) (stating that the employer can prove the first prong of the affirmative defense when
it responds to a report of harassment “in a prompt and reasonable manner”), aff’d sub nom.
Conatzer v. Med. Prof’l Bldg. Servs. Corp., 95 F. App’x 276 (10th Cir. 2004); see also Grossman,
supra note 9, at 15–16 (stating that adequate correction requires employers to have an appropriate
grievance procedure and respond appropriately to complaints by taking actions “reasonably
calculated to stop the harassment”); Tippett, supra note 2, at 246–47 (stating that employers do
not consider an employer’s failure to fire a harasser to be unreasonable and that this prong can
often be satisfied by a warning or transferring the victim away from the harasser).
44. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08 (“[W]hile proof that an employee failed to fulfill the
corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing an
unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the employer, a demonstration
of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the employer’s burden under the second element of
the defense.”).
45. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 9, at 21 (“[C]ourts have strictly enforced the victim’s
duty to complain.”); Hébert, supra note 16, at 721–29 (discussing cases where victims failed to
report right away and courts held that they were unreasonable, thereby allowing the employer to
win on the affirmative defense); Lawton, supra note 8, at 254–59 (discussing cases where
employees were afraid to report harassment because of retaliation but the courts held that a delay
of as little as six weeks from the first incident could mean that the plaintiffs “unreasonably failed
to avail themselves of their employer’s grievance mechanism[s]”).
46. 83 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (E.D. Mo. 2000).
47. Id. at 1033.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1034.
50. Conatzer v. Med. Prof’l Bldg. Servs., Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1270 (N.D. Okla.
2003), aff'd sub nom. Conatzer v. Med. Prof'l Bldg. Servs. Corp., 95 F. App’x 276 (10th Cir.
2004).
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when they first experience the harassment, the delay is not excused.51 In
one case, the court held that a seven-day delay in complaining was
unreasonable even though the harassment began on the plaintiff’s first
day of employment.52
And even if the plaintiff’s delay is because she fears retaliation, the
courts will likely find her behavior unreasonable.53 In one case, the
plaintiff was deemed unreasonable in failing to report even though her
supervisor told her she would be terminated if she made such a report.54
In another especially egregious case, the plaintiff’s claim was dismissed
despite the fact that her supervisor had forcibly raped her and had showed
her his gun several times; the court held that her fear was not enough to
excuse her delay in reporting.55
Perhaps most frustratingly, some courts have held that if the employer
satisfies prong one of the affirmative defense (takes reasonable steps to
prevent and correct harassment), it does not have to also satisfy the
second prong of the defense.56 These courts have so held even though the
United States Supreme Court made clear in both Burlington Industries,
Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton that the test is
conjunctive.57 When employees do gather up enough nerve to report
harassment, they frequently experience retaliation.58 And as
demonstrated below, plaintiffs often have difficulty with this claim as
well.

51. Hébert, supra note 16, at 728 (citing Dennis v. Nevada, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1185 (D.
Nev. 2003)) (discussing a case in which the plaintiff failed to report harassment right away
because she was a probationary employee and the court held that her failure to report was
unreasonable).
52. Marsicano v. Am. Soc’y of Safety Eng’rs, No. 97 C 7819, 1998 WL 603128, at *7 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 4, 1998).
53. See Grossman, supra note 9, at 22 (stating that a generalized fear of retaliation is likely
not going to be a sufficient justification for not promptly reporting); Hébert, supra note 16, at 725
(stating that subjective fear of retaliation is not enough to allow the plaintiff to survive the
defendant’s proof of the affirmative defense).
54. Sconce v. Tandy Corp., 9 F. Supp. 2d 773, 778 (W.D. Ky. 1998).
55. Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1276, 1289–90 (11th Cir.
2003) (per curiam).
56. See, e.g., McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 772 (8th Cir. 2004) (allowing
the employer to meet the affirmative defense despite the inability to prove the second element);
Brown v. Henderson, 155 F. Supp. 2d 502, 512 (M.D.N.C. 2000) (holding that the employer need
not prove the second element when the first element is met); Jaudon v. Elder Health, Inc., 125 F.
Supp. 2d 153, 164 (D. Md. 2000) (same).
57. Grossman, supra note 7, at 1044; see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775, 807 (1998) (stating that the affirmative defense “comprises two necessary elements:
(a) . . . and (b)” (emphasis added)).
58. E.g., U.S. EEOC, supra note 8, at 16.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 5 [], Art. 7

810

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

C. Retaliation Basics
Section 704(a) of Title VII states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to discriminate against any of his
employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this title, or because he has
made a charge . . . or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing . . . .59
To establish a prima facie case for retaliation, plaintiffs must
demonstrate (1) protected activity, either participation or opposition; (2)
an adverse employment action; and (3) causation between the two.60 All
three of these elements present roadblocks for a plaintiff bringing a
retaliation claim.
First, to meet the “protected activity” element, a plaintiff either needs
to engage in “participation”—bringing a charge of discrimination or
participating in any proceeding—or “opposition”—opposing a practice
made unlawful by Title VII.61 Participation activities, such as complaints
or charges filed with the EEOC or a state antidiscrimination agency, or a
lawsuit in court, are typically external to the company.62 Opposition
activity, such as complaining to an HR officer or supervisor, is typically
internal and often informal.63
The participation clause receives almost absolute protection.64 Courts
have held that participation is protected even if the underlying claim is
without merit—and even when the plaintiff was unreasonable in
believing it did have merit.65 For example, imagine an employee files a
charge with the EEOC alleging that he was harassed because of his class
(e.g., because he was poor). Title VII clearly does not protect against
income-based discrimination or harassment66 and yet, as long as the
employee filed the charge in good faith, honestly believing it was a valid
charge, he would be protected if he experienced retaliation for having
filed that charge.67
59. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 704(a), 78 Stat. 241, 257 (1964) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012)).
60. See, e.g., Durant v. D.C. Gov’t, 875 F.3d 685, 696–97 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citing Holcomb
v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 901–02 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
62. B. Glenn George, Revenge, 83 TUL. L. REV. 439, 446–47 (2008).
63. Id. at 448.
64. Id. at 446–47.
65. See, e.g., Glover v. S.C. Law Enf’t Div., 170 F.3d 411, 412 (4th Cir. 1999).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
67. See Sanders v. Madison Square Garden, LP, 525 F. Supp. 2d 364, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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The opposition clause, however, does not receive such absolute
protection.68 Instead, courts have required the plaintiff to demonstrate
that she had a reasonable and good faith belief that the conduct she
complained about was unlawful.69 In the context of an employee’s
complaints about sexual harassment, the employee would have to
demonstrate that she had a reasonable belief she was the victim of
unlawful harassment.70 As discussed above, one element the plaintiff
must prove is that the harassment was “severe or pervasive.”71 Individual
instances of harassment, unless they amount to an unwanted touching that
is sexual in nature, are not likely to be considered “severe.”72 For
instance, rubbing someone’s shoulders is not likely to be considered
severe but grabbing someone’s breasts would likely be seen as severe.73
If conduct is not severe, it must be pervasive.74 Thus, if a woman
complains about one offensive or demeaning statement or joke, and the
employer retaliates against her for complaining, courts will likely hold
that she did not have a reasonable, good faith belief that the conduct she
complained about violated Title VII, and her retaliation claim will fail.75
This “reasonable belief” rule interacts with the second step of the
employer’s affirmative defense in harassment claims in especially
pernicious ways. As explained above, employers can avoid liability for a
supervisor’s harassment if they can establish a two-prong affirmative
defense.76 The second prong of the affirmative defense is that the plaintiff
failed to take advantage of preventative opportunities.77 The most
68. Thus, using the above example, because a reasonable person would not believe that
income-based discrimination or harassment is unlawful under Title VII, if an employee
complained to HR that he was the victim of income-based harassment, this would not be protected
activity and the employer could terminate him for that complaint with impunity.
69. See Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001) (per curiam) (assuming
without deciding that the reasonable, good faith belief rule is correct).
70. Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1994) (per curiam); see Breeden, 532
U.S. at 270.
71. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
72. See Breeden, 532 U.S. at 271 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788
(1998)).
73. See, e.g., Gerald v. Univ. of P.R., 707 F.3d 7, 18 (1st Cir. 2013) (stating that a single
incident in which the supervisor grabbed plaintiff’s breast was sufficient to meet the standard).
But see Clarke, supra note 3, at 7 (stating that some courts have held that even repeated instances
of unwanted sexual touching do not count as harassment).
74. Lauderdale v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 512 F.3d 157, 163 (5th Cir. 2007)
(“Frequent incidents of harassment, though not severe, can reach the level of ‘pervasive’ . . . .”).
75. Breeden, 532 U.S. at 271; see also Grossman, supra note 7, at 1040 (stating that the
Breeden standard “unleash[ed] a torrent of bad case law”).
76. See supra Section I.B.
77. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
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common way the employer proves this prong is to show that the plaintiff
delayed in reporting the harassment.78 When this affirmative defense is
combined with the reasonable belief rule, the catch-22 emerges.79
Assume a victim of harassment reports harassment right away, when it
first occurs, and assume the harassment is verbal and not physical. If the
employee is retaliated against, she will likely lose the retaliation claim
because the court will hold that she did not have a reasonable belief that
the harassment she complained of was “severe or pervasive.”80 But if she
waits until she has been harassed several more times, so that she has a
reasonable belief that the harassment she experienced was “pervasive,”
she will very likely lose on the harassment claim because the employer
will be able to establish that she failed to take advantage of preventive
opportunities by complaining earlier.81 In other words, she loses her
retaliation claim if she reports too early, and she loses her harassment
claim if she reports too late.
The second hurdle a plaintiff experiences in bringing a valid
retaliation claim is that she has to prove that she suffered an adverse
employment action.82 The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington
Northern & Santa Fe Railway v. White83 announced the standard for
determining whether a retaliatory employment action is sufficiently
severe to qualify as an adverse employment action. The Court held that
to meet the standard, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the action “would
have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee.”84 The action
must be “harmful to the point that [it] could well dissuade a reasonable
worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”85
Although this seems like a fairly broad standard,86 the lower courts
have held that many actions are not “materially adverse.”87 Of relevance
to this Article, courts almost uniformly hold that “shunning,”

78. See Grossman, supra note 7, at 1045 & n.103 (“[C]ourts took [an] . . . unrealistic view
of how quickly and assertively employees must complain.”).
79. See id. at 1045 (noting that at the same time courts were insisting that employees rush
to file complaints for fear of forfeiting their harassment claims, the courts were also weakening
retaliation protections).
80. Id. at 1046.
81. Id. at 1044–46.
82. See, e.g., Durant v. D.C. Gov’t, 875 F.3d 685, 696–97 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
83. 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
84. Id. at 57.
85. Id.
86. See Grossman, supra note 7, at 1039 (construing the Burlington standard broadly);
Walker, supra note 18, at 21.
87. See Sandra F. Sperino, Retaliation and the Reasonable Person, 67 FLA. L. REV. 2031,
2041–42 (2015).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss5/7

16

Buonocore Porter: Relationships and Retaliation in the #MeToo Era

2020]

RELATIONSHIPS AND RETALIATION IN THE #METOO ERA

813

“ostracizing,” and being harassed do not rise to the level of an adverse
employment action.88
The courts’ reasoning in these cases varies widely. Often courts
simply hold, without much explanation, that the harm was not significant
enough to deter someone from filing a charge.89 These courts argue that
“retaliation law should not respond to trivial harms, petty slights, or
minor annoyances.”90 Scholars have also theorized that when judges
write opinions holding that certain conduct does not constitute an adverse
employment action, they tend to “issue broad opinions that appear to
hold, as a matter of law, that a particular action is never serious enough
to create liability.”91 Lower courts then rely on these opinions in
subsequent cases where a similar adverse action is present. 92 Professor
Sandra F. Sperino calls this the “problem of perceived precedent.”93 Or
perhaps, the reason for the courts’ constrained interpretation of what
constitutes an adverse employment action is that federal judges, who have
lifetime job security, are less likely to feel threatened or deterred by
actions that would deter a reasonable worker, who does not enjoy such
job security.94
The third hurdle in bringing a successful retaliation claim is that the
plaintiff must prove causation—she must prove that her complaint
(“protected activity”) was a but-for cause of the adverse employment
action she suffered.95 Employers are often smart enough to hide any
retaliatory motive. Furthermore, unless a plaintiff has been a perfect
88. See, e.g., Brown v. Advocate S. Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1106–07 (7th Cir.
2012) (being called “cry babies” and “trouble makers” by supervisor was not adverse action);
Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 657–58 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that coworker
harassment, including name-calling, physical intimidation, false accusations, vandalizing
belongings, and verbal threats, was not retaliatory); Stephens v. Erickson, 569 F.3d 779, 790–92
(7th Cir. 2009) (holding that supervisors yelling at plaintiff and physically isolating him from
other employees did not rise to level of adverse employment action); Reeves v. Tenn. Farmers
Mut. Ins., No. 1:12–cv–00018, 2013 WL 2177918, at *9, *12–13 (M.D. Tenn. May 20, 2013)
(finding that intimidation, unprofessional behavior, and rudeness would not dissuade a reasonable
employee from complaining), aff’d, 555 F. App’x 509 (6th Cir. 2014); Clay v. Lafarge N. Am.,
985 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1030–33 (S.D. Iowa 2013) (holding that shunning and ostracism at work
did not satisfy the standard).
89. See Brake, supra note 5, at 32–33 (stating that courts tend to assume that people will
put up with a lot of “pushback from colleagues without it weakening their resolve to complain”).
90. Sperino, supra note 87, at 2042.
91. Id. at 2055.
92. Id. at 2057.
93. Id. at 2056–61.
94. See Estrich, supra note 27, at 846–47 (discussing the distance between appellate judges
and everyday women who need to keep their jobs and thus do not object to or report harassment
like judges think they should).
95. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013) (requiring but-for
causation in retaliation cases under Title VII).
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employee, an employer can easily generate a legitimate, nonretaliatory
motive for the adverse employment action. Often the only evidence
plaintiffs have to prove causation is the temporal proximity between the
two events. Thus, if a woman complains about harassment one day and
is terminated the next, that is pretty strong evidence that retaliation was
at play.96 But most employers are savvy enough to avoid such a close
temporal proximity. And some courts hold that even a two- or threemonth temporal proximity is too long to be indicative of a retaliatory
motive.97
Now, revisiting Nina’s story, change the facts to imagine that Nina
decided to report to the director of HR (John’s boss) the harassment she
experienced at the HR retreat. Further, imagine that John is angry with
her and refuses to talk to or call her to get her legal advice or schedule
trainings at the plants (something that comprises a large part of Nina’s
job). Nina is not sure whether he has turned the other HR managers
against her, but she does notice that the frequency of calls from the eight
plant managers John supervises has decreased dramatically. At
headquarters, where Nina works, she notices some of the other lawyers
hunched together, whispering to each other while glancing over at her,
which she takes as a pretty clear sign that they know about her complaint
and are talking about her. At the next company-wide HR event six months
later, John and the other plant managers that he supervises refuse to talk
to her and ignore her when she tries to approach them. All of this is very
upsetting to Nina who, as stated in the original story, is a people pleaser
and usually gets along with everyone.
If Nina filed a retaliation claim against the employer, it would not
stand much chance of success. The first hurdle would be the reasonable
belief rule.98 In other words, when Nina reported harassment, did she
have a reasonable belief that the harassment she was reporting was
unlawful? This is a close call, but at least some courts would say that the
two instances of harassment by John, even with him touching her thigh,
would not be considered severe or pervasive; therefore, Nina, especially
because she is expected to know the law,99 could not have reasonably
96. See, e.g., Lord v. High Voltage Software, Inc., 839 F.3d 556, 563–64 (7th Cir. 2016)
(holding that termination two days after protected expression was sufficiently suspicious, unless
other evidence showed that plaintiff would have been terminated anyway).
97. See, e.g., Sherris v. City Colls. of Chi., No. 15 C 9078, 2018 WL 999902, at *8 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 21, 2018) (holding that even a seven-week time gap between plaintiff’s initial report of
harassment and termination was too long to support a finding of retaliation).
98. See Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001) (per curiam).
99. To be clear, judges often hold nonlawyers to a reasonable belief standard that assumes
knowledge of the appropriate law, including circuit-specific precedent. See, e.g., Brianne J.
Gorod, Rejecting “Reasonableness”: A New Look at Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision, 56
AM. U. L. REV. 1469, 1492 & n.104 (2007) (criticizing a decision where the court assumed that
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believed that she was opposing unlawful behavior. The second hurdle
would be establishing that the relationship-based harms Nina experienced
were adverse employment actions.100 As discussed above and below,101
most courts hold that these types of relationship-based harms are not
adverse employment actions because they would not dissuade a
reasonable worker from bringing a charge of discrimination. And yet, in
the actual Nina story (not the modified one for purposes of analyzing the
potential retaliation claim), Nina was dissuaded from complaining about
the harassment because of the fear of relationship-based harms. Finally,
Nina might have difficulty proving causation. Assuming there are no
emails or other evidence demonstrating that John and the other HR
managers were ignoring her because of her complaint against John, Nina
would only have the temporal proximity between her report of the
harassment and the ostracization she experienced. Because some of this
did not occur until six months later at the subsequent HR retreat, most
courts would hold that Nina could not establish causation, and her claim
would fail.
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WORKPLACE RELATIONSHIPS
This Part will outline the argument that workplace relationships are
important for many workers, but especially for women. Scholarship,
caselaw, and theory all support the reality that workplace relationships
matter.
A. How Workplace Relationships Interact with Harassment and
Retaliation
There is a great deal of evidence supporting the idea that maintaining
relationships in the workplace motivates women to forego reporting or
complaining about harassment. This Section first discusses some of the
literature on this topic before turning to some specific caselaw examples.

the appropriate benchmark for assessing the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s belief in reporting
harassing behavior was the definition of sexual harassment established in the caselaw). As Gorod
states, the courts often determine reasonableness of the plaintiff’s belief based on what the law
says, rather than what the general public believes. Id. at 1492. This approach holds plaintiffs
responsible for understanding the current state of the law. Id. And in areas where the law
surrounding harassment or discrimination is uncertain, Gorod points out: “If the courts cannot
agree, how are individual citizens supposed to know?” Id. at 1495.
100. See, e.g., Durant v. D.C. Gov’t, 875 F.3d 685, 696–97 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
101. See supra note 88; infra Section II.A.2.
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1. Scholarship on Women and Workplace Relationships
As mentioned earlier, the empirical evidence demonstrates that very
few women complain about harassment.102 Both legal scholars and social
scientists have discussed the reasons for this lack-of-reporting
phenomenon. According to Professor Anne Lawton, one of the reasons
that plaintiffs do not complain is because they are worried about making
the workplace “unpleasant.”103 Other scholars confirm that employees do
not report harassment in part because they are worried about the hostility
of coworkers.104
Professor L. Camille Hébert explained that women are socialized to
avoid conflict and therefore are more likely than men to indicate that they
did not report harassment because of fear of being labeled a
troublemaker.105 Many victims who reported harassment subsequently
had a sense that coworkers were talking about them behind their back.106
Researchers in one study found that claiming that one has been a
victim of discrimination is not “socially desirable” because these
individuals risk being labeled as “hypersensitive, emotional, and
generally unpleasant.”107 When individuals consider reporting
discrimination or harassment, they consider how it will affect their
relationships and influence their peers’ perceptions of them.108 They also
worry about the backlash of confronting discrimination: “This blamepointing process may be unpleasant for stigmatized people, especially if
the perpetrator of discrimination is someone whom they will have to
interact with on a regular basis.”109 And their fears are warranted,
according to this study. Participants in the study devalued a black man
who attributed his failure to discrimination, rating him as more
102. See Lawton, supra note 8, at 209, 243, 254–55.
103. Id. at 256.
104. Bergman et al., supra note 19, at 237; Grossman, supra note 9, at 51–52 (noting that
victims do not complain about harassment because they are worried about being ostracized by
their coworkers); Walker, supra note 18, at 19 (“Being a ‘snitch,’ ‘ratting out’ or ‘telling on’ one’s
peers is behavior that even my 6-year-old has already learned to condemn . . . .”); see also
Fitzgerald et al., supra note 14, at 127 (stating that “[s]tudies of victims consistently report that
fear of personal or organizational retaliation is the major constraint” for responding assertively to
harassment).
105. Hébert, supra note 16, at 731 (citing Denise H. Lach & Patricia A. Gwartney-Gibbs,
Sociological Perspectives on Sexual Harassment and Workplace Dispute Resolution, 42 J.
VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 102 (1993)).
106. See, e.g., Lawton, supra note 15, at 621 (stating that the silence after she reported
harassment was “deafening” and that she was certain that her colleagues were talking about her
behind closed doors).
107. Cheryl R. Kaiser & Carol T. Miller, Stop Complaining! The Social Costs of Making
Attributions to Discrimination, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 254, 255 (2001).
108. Id.
109. Id.
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“hypersensitive, emotional, argumentative, irritating, trouble making,
and complaining.”110 This negative impression was created even when
the study was manipulated so that discrimination was certain to have
occurred (thus justifying the man’s attribution).111
In addition to social pressures to maintain workplace relationships,
some women also feel social pressure to be polite and passive rather than
aggressive.112 Scholars explained that women often felt guilty about
being too assertive.113 In a study of lawyers who experienced incivility or
mistreatment, very few complained to anyone and none of them reported
formally because they were worried about being labeled “weak” or a
“feminazi.”114 They also did not want to be seen as “whining [or]
complaining” and did not want to be labeled as a “troublemaker.”115
Being ostracized by coworkers is one type of retaliation that women
experience when they report harassment, and they often believe they are
worse off after they report.116
Women want to preserve not only their relationships with
coworkers117 (who might be angry if they report harassment of a beloved
coworker or supervisor) but they also often care deeply about preserving
the relationship with the harasser himself.118 Women often respond
passively to harassment by a supervisor to remain friendly and preserve
the working relationship with the supervisor.119 Some victims of
harassment are worried that the harasser will lose his job and that the

110. Id. at 261.
111. Id. at 262.
112. Id. at 256 (pointing to a study suggesting that one of the perceived costs of reporting is
the violation of norms governing polite behavior); Janet K. Swim & Lauri L. Hyers, Excuse Me—
What Did You Just Say?!: Women’s Public and Private Responses to Sexist Remarks, 35 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 68, 69 (1999).
113. See, e.g., Fitzgerald et al., supra note 14, at 127.
114. Cortina et al., supra note 13, at 249, 251.
115. Id. at 266.
116. Hébert, supra note 16, at 741; see also Bodensteiner, supra note 7, at 38–39 (stating
that when those who complain “are disliked and viewed as ‘troublemakers’ [or] ‘hypersensitive,’
then complaining carries a social cost”).
117. See Hébert, supra note 16, at 740 (stating that women often believe that reporting sexual
harassment will prevent them from being accepted by their coworkers and many women believe
that acceptance is “critical”).
118. See, e.g., Fitzgerald et al., supra note 14, at 122 (stating that many victims are reluctant
to cause problems for the harasser); Hébert, supra note 16, at 739 (stating that women are more
often concerned about harming the harasser because they are socialized to be more relationshiporiented than men); see also Grossman, supra note 7, at 51–52 (noting that some women do not
want to report harassment by a supervisor because they fear losing the mentoring relationship they
have with the supervisor).
119. See Bingham & Scherer, supra note 14, at 253; Hébert, supra note 16, at 739.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

21

Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 5 [], Art. 7

818

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

harasser’s family members would suffer as well.120 Other scholars
confirmed that one inhibitor to reporting harassment was “not wanting to
hurt the man involved—clearly a gender-linked cultural value.”121
Both Professor Hébert and the EEOC Task Force Report explain that
women’s primary objective after experiencing harassment is to preserve
the relationship, rather than to punish the harasser.122 As stated by
Professor Hébert: “[E]xpecting women to react to sexually harassing
conduct in a way that is different than the manner in which they have
been socialized—and to react that way immediately and as their first
response to such conduct—punishes women for acting in precisely the
ways that they are generally expected to act.”123
The research discussed thus far has addressed why women do not
report harassment at all or delay doing so. Professor Sperino’s work
addresses whether employees would consider various harms to be
“adverse,” such that they would dissuade employees from reporting
discrimination.124 Her study revealed that many individuals would find
relationship-based harms to be materially adverse.125 Professor Sperino
conducted an empirical study using her law students, asking them to
imagine that they witnessed discrimination in the workplace.126 The study

120. Cummings & Armenta, supra note 13, at 278 (stating that when women are asked to
punish hypothetical harassers, they are often unwilling to punish them out of fear that the harasser
could lose his job or innocent family members might suffer); see also Hébert, supra note 16, at
739 (discussing how women are less likely to report for fear that reporting would harm the
harasser).
121. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 14, at 127. Other literature describes the fact that a woman’s
normal response to incidents of harassment is to ignore or avoid it in large part because women
“choose to remain friendly in order to maintain comfortable working relationships,” and that “this
behavior is consistent with traditional . . . relationship-oriented feminine behavior.” Suzanne L.
Osman, Victim Resistance: Theory and Data on Understanding Perceptions of Sexual
Harassment, 50 SEX ROLES 267, 267 (2004). Osman explains that because women desire to
maintain friendly relationships at work, their most assertive response might be asking the
perpetrator to stop. Id. Although, sometimes this approach backfires because men might see
friendly behavior as sexual interest, even when the woman says to stop. Id. at 270. Some men in
this study interpreted smiling as sexual interest. Id. at 273.
122. See U.S. EEOC, supra note 8, at 40 (stating that many employees avoid reporting
harassment because they do not want a coworker to lose his job over relatively minor harassing
behavior; they simply want the harassment to stop); Hébert, supra note 16, at 732.
123. Hébert, supra note 16, at 733; see also Lawton, supra note 8, at 209 (“[I]f the vast
majority of harassment victims do not report harassment, then the reasonable response is not to
report . . . .”).
124. See Sperino, supra note 87, at 2042–43.
125. See id. at 2044; see also Walker, supra note 18, at 19 (stating that retaliation can be
“exceedingly subtle”).
126. Sperino, supra note 87, at 2043. Of course, the scenario in Professor Sperino’s study is
a bit different than what this Article discusses, because in her study, participants did not
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then asked the participants questions about whether certain anticipated
actions would dissuade them from complaining about the discrimination
to an employer.127 The survey results revealed that many study
participants believed that various employment actions would be
materially adverse in situations where courts have routinely held those
employment actions to not be materially adverse.128 Of relevance here,
50.53% of participants said that social ostracism by coworkers would
dissuade them from reporting discrimination.129
2. Caselaw on Relationship-Based Harms
As mentioned above, many plaintiffs claim retaliation when the only
(or primary) harm they experienced was relationship-based harm (and
they almost always lose). For instance, in Dennis v. Nevada,130 the
plaintiff’s retaliation claim failed because the court held that the
ostracization she experienced by her coworkers, along with being
assigned undesirable shifts, was not enough to constitute an adverse
employment action.131 In Hellman v. Weisberg,132 the plaintiff alleged
retaliation after she participated in an investigation of a discrimination
complaint.133 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that she received
“snubbing” from her coworkers, but because the court had previously
held that ostracism by coworkers does not constitute an adverse
employment action unless it has an effect on the ability to do the job, the
ostracism she suffered was mostly social in nature and therefore was not
actionable.134

experience harassment directly; they witnessed someone else experiencing discrimination or
harassment.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2045.
129. Id. Professor Brake agrees that courts often are not in tune with how reasonable
employees will react: “[S]hunning the complainant and siding with the accused appears highly
likely to dissuade many, if not most, persons from complaining.” Brake, supra note 5, at 34. In
fact, Professor Brake notes that some research on workplace dynamics indicates that the harm
from ostracism is actually worse from coworkers than supervisors. Id. at 35 (“[S]hunning, social
exclusion, and incivility [by coworkers] push targeted employees to leave their employers at a
greater rate than similar conduct by supervisors.”).
130. 282 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (D. Nev. 2003).
131. Id. at 1186.
132. 360 F. App’x 776 (9th Cir. 2009).
133. Id. at 777.
134. Id. at 778–79; see also Mannat v. Bank of Am., 339 F.3d 792, 803 (9th Cir. 2003)
(stating that ostracism is not an adverse employment action); Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229
F.3d 917, 929 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that ostracism suffered at the hands of coworkers cannot
constitute an adverse employment action).
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Similarly, in Recio v. Creighton University,135 the plaintiff argued that
after she filed an EEOC complaint, she suffered “shunning” by her
coworkers.136 The court held that the instances of ostracism experienced
by the plaintiff were no more than “nonactionable petty slights” under
Burlington.137 In Rennard v. Woodworkers Supply, Inc.,138 the plaintiff
testified that she was shunned by her coworkers.139 The court held that
although coworker retaliatory harassment can sometimes constitute an
adverse employment action, it will only rise to this level if management
either orchestrated the harassment or knew about it and acquiesced in it,
and there was no evidence of that occurring here.140
In Brown v. Advocate South Suburban Hospital,141 after reporting the
harassment, the plaintiffs were called crybabies, troublemakers, and
spoiled children by their managers.142 The court stated that this behavior
does not constitute a materially adverse employment action and that
“‘[p]ersonality conflicts at work that generate antipathy’ and ‘snubbing
by supervisors and co-workers’ are not actionable . . . .”143
Finally, Nina feared relationship-based retaliation. Nina first feared
that other HR managers would think poorly of her if she made a fuss
about John’s boorish behavior. She also feared that, if she reported John’s
behavior, the HR director for the corporation and the general counsel
would perceive her as “whiny,” “ultra-sensitive,” and “not a good fit.”
She was even worried about harming her relationship with John. As much
as John’s behavior irritated her, Nina did not want him to get in trouble.
She knew John had a wife and a small child and that if he was fired for
harassment, it would likely affect his family. Thus, although she was not
seriously worried about losing her job or suffering any other type of
economic, tangible harm, the concern over relationship-based harms was
enough to keep her from reporting the harassment.
135. 521 F.3d 934 (8th Cir. 2008).
136. Id. at 939.
137. Id. at 940–41 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 69 (2006)).
138. 101 F. App’x 296 (10th Cir. 2004).
139. Id. at 308.
140. Id.
141. 700 F.3d 1101 (7th Cir. 2012).
142. Id. at 1107.
143. Id. (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)); see
also Fercello v. Cty. of Ramsey, 612 F.3d 1069, 1081 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that coworkers’
actions of making plaintiff feel unwelcome at meetings, rolling their eyes at her, interrupting her,
and ignoring her contributions were not sufficient to be an adverse employment action). But see
Burrell v. Shepard, 321 F. Supp. 3d 1, 13–14 (D.D.C. 2018) (denying summary judgment for
employer on plaintiff’s retaliation claim where plaintiff alleged “that her coworkers refused to
speak to her, ‘making it very difficult for her to perform her assigned tasks,’” and “made
derogatory comments about [her] on social media”).
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To be clear, although many of the victims in the above cases are
women, certainly some men suffer from relationship-based harms. For
instance, in Somoza v. University of Denver,144 the plaintiff was a man
who complained of retaliation that consisted of his coworkers laughing at
his opinions and talking behind his back.145 The court held these actions
were not materially adverse.146
Interestingly, the results of Professor Sperino’s study are inconsistent
with the literature discussed above. In her study, when she asked her
students whether they would be deterred from reporting discrimination if
they knew they would suffer “social ostracism” by their coworkers, more
men (57.69%) than women (42.86%) stated that they would be deterred
by such relationship-based harms.147 One explanation for this is simply
that it does not necessarily reflect reality, either because the research
participants were law students or simply because they were research
participants—other scholars have noted that that there is often a “striking
gap between expected and actual responses to bias”; people think they
will report much more often than they actually do.148
Even if men sometimes suffer relationship-based harms, the above
discussion in this Section should make clear that it is more often women
who worry about their workplace relationships.149 And regardless of the
employee’s sex, the reality is that many employees will forego reporting
harassment or discrimination because they fear relationship-based
harms.150
Even if it is intuitive to some readers that women are more likely than
men to be dissuaded from reporting by relationship-based harms, the
Section below both reinforces what might be intuitive to many and also
144. 513 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2008).
145. Id. at 1215.
146. Id.
147. Sperino, supra note 87, at 2046.
148. Bodensteiner, supra note 7, at 38 (quoting Brake, supra note 20, at 30); Fitzgerald et
al., supra note 14, at 119 (noting that real victims “behave quite differently than research
participants or the general public say they would behave”); Grossman, supra note 9, at 25 (stating
that real victims often do not behave like fake victims in research studies); Swim & Hyers, supra
note 112, at 80–81, 85 (discussing studies that demonstrated that women believed they would be
more direct and more likely to confront harassment than how they would actually behave if it
happened to them). In other words, merely labeling a remark as prejudicial and wanting to respond
is not predictive of actually responding because there are normative pressures not to respond.
149. See, e.g., Bingham & Scherer, supra note 14, at 260 (stating that the response to
harassment was gendered; women talked to family and friends about harassment more often than
men) (stating that women find more support in friendships than men do); Hébert, supra note 16,
at 732 (stating that women are more comfortable using informal means of trying to resolve
problems in the workplace because formal means are inconsistent with the manner in which they
view conflict resolution).
150. See Sperino, supra note 87, at 2046.
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explains why—why is it that women are more likely to worry about
workplace relationships than men? This Article explains how one
feminist theory can help to reinforce this intuitive claim that women are
generally more relationship-oriented than men. As an initial disclaimer:
despite the Author’s belief that it is more often women who fear and
experience these relationship-based harms in the workplace, the reforms
proposed below should, of course, apply to all sexes and genders.
B. Relational Feminism Basics151
The relational (or cultural)152 feminism movement is said to have
begun with Psychologist Carol Gilligan and her influential book, In a
Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development.153
Gilligan’s book is based on research projects involving moral choice.154
In her studies, she began to hear distinctions in the voices of men and
women.155 Prior research regarding moral development had always been
based almost exclusively on male subjects, which allowed male norms to
prevail, and women were therefore seen as deviant from the norm.156 For
instance, in one psychologist’s study, models for a healthy life cycle were
men who seem distant in their relationships and who subordinate
relationships to achievement.157 Because women keep and place an
emphasis on relationships, they appear deficient in moral developmental
studies that focus only on men.158
Although Gilligan never announced a new theory of cultural or
relational feminism, her work is said to have begun the relational
feminism strand of feminist theory and feminist legal theory.159
According to relational feminism, “women value intimacy, develop a
capacity for nurturance, and an ethic of care for the ‘other’ with which
we are connected, just as we learn to dread and fear separation from the
151. This Section is derived in part from an earlier work of mine. See Nicole Buonocore
Porter, Embracing Caregiving and Respecting Choice: An Essay on the Debate over Changing
Gender Norms, 41 SW. L. REV. 1, 6–11 (2011) (discussing cultural feminism).
152. Different scholars use different words—either “cultural” feminism or “relational”
feminism. See, e.g., Aya Gruber, Neofeminism, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1325, 1338 (2013). This Article
uses them interchangeably, though it prefers “relational” feminism because it is more descriptive,
but so much of the early scholarship on this theory uses “cultural” feminism.
153. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S
DEVELOPMENT (1982); see also Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 15
(1988) (“‘Cultural feminism’ . . . is in large part defined by Gilligan’s book.”).
154. GILLIGAN, supra note 153, at 2–3.
155. Id. at 1.
156. Id. at 6, 18–19, 22.
157. Id. at 154.
158. Id. at 170.
159. See, e.g., West, supra note 153, at 15.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss5/7

26

Buonocore Porter: Relationships and Retaliation in the #MeToo Era

2020]

RELATIONSHIPS AND RETALIATION IN THE #METOO ERA

823

other.”160 Women also view themselves as fundamentally connected to
others in their lives.161
Gilligan’s discussion of women’s emphasis on relationships is
noteworthy—a search in the electronic version of the book reveals the
word “relationship” 389 times. Gilligan states that women often “try to
change the rules in order to preserve relationships,”162 and that women’s
sense of self is “organized around being able to make and then to maintain
affiliations and relationships.”163 As seen in some harassment and
retaliation cases, Gilligan notes that women have difficulty putting
themselves first.164 And finally, Gilligan notes that “in all of the women’s
descriptions, identity is defined in context of relationship . . . .”165
As stated by Professor Robin West, one of the most prominent
proponents of relational feminism,166 “women are more nurturant, caring,
loving and responsible to others than are men.”167 These attributes dictate
the way that women define social relationships: “[W]omen view the
morality of actions against a standard of responsibility to others, rather
than against a standard of rights and autonomy from others.”168 Another
scholar describes cultural feminism as an ideology of female nature
reappropriated by feminists themselves in an effort to validate
undervalued female attributes.169 As Professor West argues, women are
more likely to sacrifice themselves in the care of others—what has been
called “care unconstrained by justice.”170 Professor West argues that
women often identify themselves by referencing their relationships.171
Not only do women enjoy the intimacy of relationships, according to
Professor West, but they also fear separation from others.172
Professor Aya Gruber describes the basic premise of cultural
feminism as women “valuing intimacy, prioritizing relationships over
competition, and being caring rather than dominating.”173 Professor
160. Id.
161. Id. at 17.
162. GILLIGAN, supra note 153, at 44.
163. Id. at 48 (quoting JEAN BAKER MILLER, TOWARD A NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN 83
(1976)).
164. See id. at 66.
165. Id. at 160.
166. Linda C. McClain, The Liberal Future of Relational Feminism: Robin West’s Caring
for Justice, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 477, 478 (1999).
167. West, supra note 153, at 17.
168. Id. at 17–18.
169. Linda Alcoff, Cultural Feminism Versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in
Feminist Theory, 13 SIGNS 405, 408 (1988).
170. McClain, supra note 166, at 482–83.
171. West, supra note 153, at 16–17.
172. Id. at 18–19, 28.
173. Gruber, supra note 152, at 1338.
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Gruber explains that the women described in Gilligan’s book are
communicative and not aggressive and value relationships over
individual interests.174 Professor Martha Chamallas also states that
“[c]ultural [feminism] emphasize[s] relationships, the value of intimacy,
[and] the importance of . . . caretaking.”175 This emphasis on relationships
means that women suffer more from the harm of separation and isolation
than men.176 Another scholar describes relational feminism as being
“premised on the centrality of relationships” in women’s lives.177 This
same scholar also argues that relational feminism pleads for the nurturing
of relationships and for legal intervention into relationships that cause
harm.178
Even though much of cultural feminism has been focused on women’s
caregiving capacity, Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow has addressed
whether and how women’s “different voice” could affect them in other
areas of life, such as in the workplace and how they handle dispute
resolution.179 For instance, she queried whether women’s care for others
could be helpful to women in unions; if women are more “self-sacrificing,
then they should be naturals for the collective action of unions in which
all work is for the [greater] good . . . .”180 Professor Menkel-Meadow also
noted that women’s ethic of care could affect how they negotiate;
specifically, she believed that women were more likely to compromise in
negotiation when there is an ongoing relationship involved.181 Although
not reporting harassment because of fear of harming workplace
relationships is different from the more typical illustrations of relational
feminism, it is easy to see that many women’s self-identification as being
relationship-oriented affects their willingness to potentially harm their
workplace relationships by reporting harassment.
174. Id. at 1338.
175. Martha Chamallas, Past as Prologue: Old and New Feminisms, 17 MICH. J. GENDER &
L. 157, 162 (2010).
176. McClain, supra note 166, at 493.
177. Roxana Banu, A Relational Feminist Approach to Conflict of Laws, 24 MICH. J. GENDER
& L. 1, 17 (2017).
178. Id.
179. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mainstreaming Feminist Legal Theory, 23 PAC. L.J. 1493,
1528 (1992).
180. Id. (footnote omitted). Although not relying on cultural feminism, I have made similar
arguments with respect to women and unions. See, e.g., Nicole Buonocore Porter, Women,
Unions, and Negotiation, 14 NEV. L.J. 465, 487–91 (2014).
181. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Women in Dispute Resolution: Parties, Lawyers and Dispute
Resolvers: What Difference Does “Gender Difference” Make, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2012,
at 5. Although, to be clear, Professor Menkel-Meadow argues in this piece that her impression of
gender difference has changed. She used to think that women’s “different voice” would bring a
change to dispute resolution practice but now thinks that, although gender difference matters,
context may matter more. Id. at 4–5.
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As for why cultural feminists believe that women are more focused
on relationships, Professor West argues that it is because women raise
children more often than men do.182 Because of this fact, Professor West
argues that women are “capable of a degree of physical as well as psychic
intimacy with the other which greatly exceeds men’s capacity.”183
Professor West advances what she calls a “connection thesis”—that
women’s moral voice and ethic of care happen because women learn to
be responsible for those who are physically attached and then physically
and emotionally dependent on them.184 Of course, Professor West’s
explanation of why women are more relationship-oriented than men leads
to many of the criticisms of cultural feminism, which this Article turns to
next.
C. Addressing the Critics of Relational Feminism
The criticisms of relational/cultural feminism are aplenty. The three
most prominent criticisms of it are that: (1) if women do have an “ethic
of care,” as Gilligan argues, it is socially constructed, not biologically
based;185 (2) it is essentialist to claim that all women have an ethic of care
or speak in a “different voice”; and (3) this “ethic of care” attribute is
problematic if it becomes normative rather than descriptive, i.e.,
suggesting that women should be focused on relationships rather than
simply recognizing that they are.186
1. Nature versus Nurture187
Professor Mary Joe Frug explains that the level of criticism of
Gilligan’s work is partially based on whether the critic reads Gilligan as
asserting that there are inherent, biological differences between men and
women or that these differences are socially constructed.188 Critics
generally focus on how Gilligan’s work can be read as referring to all
women and then those critics allege that Gilligan is arguing that these
182. West, supra note 153, at 13.
183. Id. at 16.
184. Id. at 14, 21.
185. To be clear, there is plenty of debate about whether Gilligan was suggesting that cultural
feminism was socially constructed or biological. See, e.g., Gruber, supra note 152, at 1339
(discussing this nature versus nurture debate of other scholars, comparing Gilligan to Professor
West; Professor Gruber believes Gilligan makes no normative judgment about the cause of
women’s different voice, but Professor West seems to link it with biology).
186. Professor Gruber describes this problem as the moral superiority of women. See id. at
1341–42.
187. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 181, at 6–7 (discussing the nature versus nurture
debate with respect to the “ethic of care”).
188. See Mary Joe Frug, Progressive Feminist Legal Scholarship: Can We Claim “A
Different Voice”?, 15 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 37, 51–53 (1992).
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differences are biological.189 Not all scholars agree. Professor Frug
argues that a better reading of Gilligan’s work reveals that Gilligan is
aware of differences between women.190 But because Gilligan’s work has
sometimes been read as assuming that sex differences are biological, this
“artificially valorizes domestic roles traditionally assumed by white
middle-class women.”191
Professor Catharine MacKinnon’s critique of cultural feminism can
be placed in this category. Her argument is that this ethic of care is not
authentic—that “[w]omen value care because men have valued us
according to the care we give them . . . . Women think in relational terms
because our existence is defined in relation to men.”192 Similarly,
Professor Joan Williams questions whether women naturally have
nurturing skills or whether they acquire them because they are forced
to.193 Other scholars echo this criticism.194
In response to this criticism, the Author personally does not think an
ethic of care is biologically based—instead, the Author believes it is
socially constructed (and that Gilligan does not believe that women’s
“different voice” is biological).195 But just because it is socially
constructed does not mean that it does not feel like a genuine, authentic
identity for many women.196 When borrowing from other scholars’
theories, the Author tends to follow the motto: take what you like and
leave the rest behind. To the extent that Gilligan, Professor West, or any
other feminist scholars think that women’s “ethic of care,” “different
189. See id. at 55.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 63.
192. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 39 (1987); see also Alcoff, supra
note 169, at 405–06 (stating that an assumption that we can know how women truly are is
“foolhardy given that every source of knowledge about women has been contaminated with
misogyny and sexism”).
193. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER 188 (2000); see also Fernanda G. Nicola,
Intimate Liability: Emotional Harm, Family Law, and Stereotypes Narratives in Interspousal
Torts, 19 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 445, 464 n.135 (2013) (“‘Cultural feminism’ . . . refers
to the view that ‘women have a distinct consciousness and/or culture. . . . [that] [sic] derives from
their biological situation . . . [or] emerges from their historical oppression by men. Some
versions . . . . take [sic] both “essentialist” forms (women are naturally maternal) and “social
constructionist” ones (men made women do all of the mothering).’” (alterations in original)
(quoting JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM 58–
59 (2006))).
194. See, e.g., Alcoff, supra note 169, at 411 (stating that it is a problem that cultural
feminists are not clear about whether this identity of women is innate or socially constructed).
195. See Frug, supra note 188, at 57 (stating that there is an ambiguity in the book as to
whether Gilligan is talking about all women or not).
196. See, e.g., Gruber, supra note 152, at 1355 (stating that women’s choice to mother is
authentic despite the fact that society constructs social structures in such a way that basically
forces women to mother).
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voice,” or focus on relationships is biologically based, the Author chooses
to leave that behind. But that does not mean that the cultural feminist
theory does not offer some valuable insights worth taking. Because even
if it is socially constructed, many women see themselves in the work of
Gilligan. Many women cannot stop themselves from caring about their
relationships, even those that might not deserve their attention or care.
The law should recognize how most women feel and behave, even if it is
socially constructed.
2. Essentialism of Relational Feminism
Note that the last sentence used the words “most women.” Some
criticize Gilligan’s work (and those who followed her) for assuming that
all women are socialized to have an ethic of care. 197 For instance,
Professor Williams argues that those who do not see themselves in
Gilligan’s descriptions feel violated because they see relational feminism
as marginalizing their definition of womanhood.198 Professor Gruber also
recognizes that there are those who critique relational feminism because
it does not describe them.199 Similarly, Professor Frug states that the
problem with one view of Gilligan’s work is that it excludes the women
who do not see themselves in Gilligan’s descriptions, such as women of
color, non-middle class women, lesbian women, non-Western women, or
older women.200 Professor West has also been criticized for assuming that
all women have this ethic of care, which seems to ignore women’s
autonomy.201
The Author is sensitive to the essentialism argument but thinks society
is making a mistake if it ignores the way most women feel and act even
if not all women feel and act that way.202 As stated by one scholar: “[W]e
can say at one and the same time that gender is not natural, biological,
universal, ahistorical, or essential and yet still claim that gender is
relevant because we are taking gender as a position from which to act
197. See Frug, supra note 188, at 48 (stating that the danger with Gilligan’s work is that it
has the “effect of perpetuating gender as an essential, irreducible part of identity”); Carrie MenkelMeadow, What’s Gender Got to Do with It?: The Politics and Morality of an Ethic of Care, 22
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 265, 270, 275–78 (1996) (stating that the ethic of care is criticized
because it is assumed to be essentialist); see also Porter, supra note 151, at 20–21 (“What matters
to me is not whether [an ethic of care] is biologically based or socially constructed but that we
stop penalizing women for engaging in caregiving.”).
198. WILLIAMS, supra note 193, at 194.
199. See Gruber, supra note 152, at 1347.
200. Frug, supra note 188, at 64.
201. See McClain, supra note 166, at 481.
202. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 197, at 285 (stating that the ethic of care is empirically
connected to gender).
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politically.”203 Perhaps more simply, as discussed below, women who do
not see themselves in the work of Gilligan—women who are not so
concerned about their workplace relationships that they avoid or delay
reporting harassment—are not at all penalized by this Article’s proposals.
Women who do not have an “ethic of care” and are therefore willing to
report harassment right away are already adequately protected by the
law—in fact, they are the “reasonable” women so many courts insist
upon.
3. Normative versus Descriptive
A third critique of cultural feminism is that some see it as not just
arguing that women do have a “different voice” or “ethic of care” but that
they should.204 For instance, Professor Williams argues that people
should link the ethic of care not with biology but with gender role
allocations. She argues that feminists can embrace the value of
domesticity even if they “seek to change the subordinated context in
which family and caring work occurs.”205 Professor Williams further
argues that this distinction matters to those who do not feel like they have
an ethic of care and therefore feel like other feminists are telling them to
behave more femininely.206
Another scholar echoes this concern, stating that although it is good
to celebrate what women do well, society should not promote the
restrictive conditions that gave rise to those attributes—the forced
parenting, the lack of autonomy.207 Society is “in danger of solidifying an
important bulwark for sexist oppression: the belief in an innate
‘womanhood’ to which we must all adhere lest we be deemed inferior or
not ‘true’ women.”208 Professor Frug also argues that one problem with
how some view Gilligan’s work (and cultural feminism more broadly) is
that “[i]t sentimentalizes and romanticizes self-sacrifice . . . [without]
acknowledg[ing] the costs and problems of this attitude.”209
Related to this critique is the fear that describing women in this way—
as more nurturing and focused on relationships—perpetuates stereotypes
203. Alcoff, supra note 169, at 433.
204. See id. at 413 (stating that the problem with cultural feminism is that it can promote
unrealistic expectations about “normal” human behavior that many cannot satisfy); MenkelMeadow, supra note 197, at 277 (stating that the problem with attributing the ethic of care to
women is that it becomes normative—women will only be valued if they are nurturing, caring,
and relationship-oriented).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 198.
207. Alcoff, supra note 169, at 414.
208. Id.
209. Frug, supra note 188, at 63.
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that could be used against women.210 The fear is that cultural feminism
appeals to conservatives and is then used to celebrate women’s role as
both mother and nurturer and to reject reforms aimed at improving
women’s work lives.211 Professor West addresses this critique by arguing
that there are differences between patriarchy and cultural feminism:
“[P]atriarchy devalues women” and “celebrates women’s different sphere
in order to reinforce women’s powerlessness” while “[c]ultural feminism
does not.”212 She also argues that society needs to show that “community,
nurturance, responsibility, and the ethic of care are values at least as
worthy of protection as autonomy, self-reliance, and individualism.”213
Although focused on the mothering aspect of cultural feminism, one
scholar’s response to this criticism is especially compelling:
[E]ven though it is true that arguing for adequate childcare
as one obvious way of meeting the needs of mothers does
suppose an orthodox division of labour, in which
responsibility for children is the province of women and not
of men, nevertheless this division is what, by and large,
actually obtains. Recognition of that in no way commits you
to supposing that the care of children is fixed eternally as
female.214
It is unnecessary to “invoke a rhetoric of idealized motherhood to demand
that women here and now need child care.”215
Extrapolating that response to the argument here, the law can account
for the fact that women often care more about relationships without
creating a normative argument that women should care more about
relationships. In other words, even if this Article’s reforms—helping to
protect women who were afraid to come forward to complain about
harassment because of the fear of hurting their workplace relationships—
were enacted, this would not harm women who do come forward right
away to report because they are not relationship oriented. These women
are still the ideal victims, according to most courts.216
210. See Gruber, supra note 152, at 1340; see also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 197, at 276
(stating that an ethic of care is often created through subordination).
211. See Gruber, supra note 152, at 1388; see also Alcoff, supra note 169, at 435 (stating
that some feminist demands associated with cultural feminism can “reinforce the right-wing’s
reification of gender differences unless and until we can formulate a political program that can
articulate these demands in a way that challenges rather than utilizes sexist discourse”).
212. West, supra note 153, at 50.
213. Id. at 66.
214. DENISE RILEY, WAR IN THE NURSERY: THEORIES OF THE CHILD AND MOTHER 194 (1983).
215. Alcoff, supra note 169, at 427.
216. See Niloofar Nejat-Bina, Employers as Vigilant Chaperones Armed with Dating
Waivers: The Intersection of Unwelcomeness and Employer Liability in Hostile Work
Environment Sexual Harassment Law, 20 BERKELEY J EMP. & LAB. L. 325, 335 (1999).
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III. REFORM: RECOGNIZING RELATIONSHIP-BASED HARMS
This Article’s reform proposal is twofold. First, victims who
eventually report harassment should not have their harassment claims
dismissed for failing to report earlier if they feared retaliation, even if the
retaliation they feared was only relationship based. Second, the law
should recognize relationship-based harms as adverse employment
actions under the retaliation doctrine.
A. Excusing Delays in Reporting Harassment
As discussed above, even when an employee has a valid harassment
claim—she suffered unwelcome harassment because of her sex that was
severe or pervasive—the employer might not be held liable. This can, and
often does, happen if the court determines that the employee failed to
timely report the harassment. As discussed above, the specific rules
regarding employer liability vary depending on whether the harasser is a
supervisor.217
If the harasser is a supervisor,218 unless the supervisor takes a
“tangible employment action” 219 against the victim, the employer has the
opportunity to establish a two-part affirmative defense: “(a) that the
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”220
Because the second prong requires the employer to prove that the plaintiff
failed to take advantage of preventive opportunities,221 if the plaintiff
delays reporting, the employer will likely be able to prove its affirmative
defense.222
217. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 803 (1998) (discussing the differences
between supervisor harassment and coworker harassment).
218. The Supreme Court defined “supervisor” in Vance v. Ball State University, 570 U.S.
421 (2013), as someone who is “empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions
against the victim.” Id. at 450.
219. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808. A tangible employment action is described as “discharge,
demotion, or undesirable reassignment.” Id.
220. Id. at 807; Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 745 (1998).
221. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 778 (“[W]hile proof that an employee failed to fulfill the
corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing an
unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the employer, a demonstration
of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the employer’s burden under the second element of
the defense.”).
222. See, e.g., Hébert, supra note 16, at 721–29 (discussing cases where victims failed to
report right away and courts held that they were unreasonable, thereby allowing the employer to
win on the affirmative defense); Lawton, supra note 8, at 253–59 (discussing cases where
employees were afraid to report harassment because of retaliation, but the courts held that a delay
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Similarly, if the harasser is a coworker, the plaintiff has the burden of
proving that the employer was negligent, which requires the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the employer knew or should have known about the
harassment and failed to take reasonable steps to prevent and remedy it.223
This test also requires the plaintiff to timely report harassment.224
And yet plaintiffs often delay reporting, in large part because they fear
retaliation. In some cases, they might not fear retaliation that results in
tangible consequences, such as a loss of job (although that is certainly a
realistic fear for many employees). Instead, they might fear retaliatory
acts (such as being shunned, ignored, humiliated) or other relationshipbased harms.225 As discussed in Part II, many employees, especially
women, fear relationship-based harms in the workplace. Because many
“reasonable” women might delay reporting, this Article proposes that
courts should not use a plaintiff’s delay in reporting harassment to
dismiss the plaintiff’s harassment claim at the summary judgment stage.
In other words, plaintiffs should be allowed to survive summary
judgment in harassment cases even if they delayed reporting as long the
delay was based on a fear of retaliation, and even if the only retaliation
they feared was some type of relationship-based harm.
This proposal is likely to face significant pushback. Employers will
argue that if they take reasonable steps to both prevent harassment before
it occurs and to remedy harassment once they learn of it, why should they
be liable for harassment that was not timely reported to them? This is a
fair criticism, to which there are two responses.
First, if the plaintiffs in these cases are also acting “reasonably,” as
Part II argued, then between the two “reasonable” actors, who should bear
the burden of the loss? The employer should, in part because it is the less
vulnerable party,226 but also, and more importantly, because it is in the
best position to prevent both the harassment and the retaliation that many
employees fear. This naturally leads to the second response to this
criticism: in the wake of the #MeToo era, employers can and should do
better at preventing harassment and retaliation from occuring.
As discussed in the EEOC Task Force Report (which, interestingly,
predated the #MeToo movement), preventing harassment is all about
of six weeks from the first incident means that the plaintiffs unreasonably failed to avail
themselves of their employer’s grievance mechanisms); supra Section I.B.
223. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799–800.
224. See id. at 806–08.
225. See, e.g., Brake, supra note 5, at 37–38 (noting that, when coworkers side with the
harasser, the risk of shunning may very well chill reasonable employees from complaining about
the harassment).
226. Cf. Estrich, supra note 27, at 838–39 (arguing that between the supervisor demanding
sex and the less powerful victim, the supervisor should bear the responsibility for the coerced
sex).
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culture changes in the organization.227 Leadership (from the C-suite all
the way down) and a commitment to a “diverse, inclusive, and respectful
workplace in which harassment is simply not acceptable” is necessary.228
Organizations must have systems in place that hold supervisors and
managers accountable for identifying and calling out harassment when
they see it; responding in a meaningful, proportional way; and insuring
that the employee reporting harassment is not retaliated against.229 If
supervisors fail to respond appropriately to a complaint of harassment or
fail to protect employees from retaliation, that supervisor should be held
accountable for those actions.230 Companies should evaluate supervisors
and managers according to how well they prevent and respond to
harassment.231 And companies should prepare for the number of
harassment incidents to rise after developing a more robust culture that
encourages reporting.232 Increased reporting is a sign that the culture
changes are working and that employees feel safe to report the
harassment.233 Eventually, the reporting rates should be expected to
decline after the culture changes have permeated the entire
organization.234 In sum, according to the EEOC, “organizational culture
is one of the key drivers of [minimizing] harassment.”235
How companies achieve this culture change is a tricky question.
While some of it will come from decisions made in the C-suite, changing
the way that supervisors treat harassment and retaliation will obviously
227. See U.S. EEOC, supra note 8, at 31.
228. Id.
229. See id.
230. Id. at 35.
231. See id. at 35–36.
232. See id. at 36.
233. See id. (stating that “[p]ositive organizational change can be reflected in an initial
increase of complaints”; this means that employees have faith in the system).
234. See id. at 36, 56 (discussing the experience of one company that experienced greater
reporting rates in the first three years of initiating a training program but then saw their complaints
decline by 70%, along with a decrease in the severity of the types of harassment complaints).
235. Id. at 54 (emphasis omitted).
An organization’s culture is set by the values of an organization. To achieve
a workplace without harassment, the values of the organization must put a
premium on diversity and inclusion, must include a belief that all employees in
a workplace deserve to be respected, regardless of their race, religion, national
origin, sex (including pregnancy, sexual orientation, or gender identity), age,
disability, or genetic information, and must make clear that part of respect means
not harassing an individual on any of those bases. In short, an organization’s
commitment to a harassment-free workplace must not be based on a compliance
mindset, and instead must be part of an overall diversity and inclusion strategy.
Id. at 31 (emphasis omitted).
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require those supervisors and managers to be appropriately trained. The
Author is reluctant to suggest more training given the uncertainty of the
success of training.236 But as noted by the EEOC Task Force Report,
training can be effective if it is not just focused on a compliance mindset
(i.e., checking off boxes to avoid liability) but is instead focused on
changing the culture of the company to increase diversity237 and inclusion
and to make sure supervisors understand how to handle complaints
appropriately.238 Employers need to acknowledge and own “well-handled
complaints, instead of burying the fact that there had been a complaint
and that discipline had been taken.”239
Another response to the critics of this proposal is that this Article is
not suggesting that plaintiffs will necessarily win when they delay
reporting—it is only proposing that they survive summary judgment so
that they can have their day in court. Part of the problem with the
summary judgment standard is that judges seem to be unable (or
unwilling) to put themselves into the shoes of harassment victims.
Perhaps this is not surprising; as stated by one scholar, society should not
expect women to behave how judges think they would behave because
judges are very rarely victims of harassment.240 Juries (especially genderdiverse juries) are in a much better position to gauge whether a
harassment victim has behaved reasonably.241
Perhaps a final response to employers’ criticisms of this proposal is
that, even if plaintiffs are more successful when their cases proceed to
trial, this Article is not proposing a change to the standard of proof a
236. See id. at 45 (stating that there are deficiencies in empirical evidence that indicates that
training alone is effective to minimize harassment); Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention, supra
note 41, at 37 (stating that some studies indicate training can be negative in that it might cause
male supervisors to forego mentoring women and because it made some employees angry about
participating); id. at 44 (stating that people should not use training as a way of limiting damages
unless they know that it works); Bisom-Rapp, Training Must Change, supra note 41, at 63–64
(noting the uncertainty about the effectiveness of training).
237. Professor Jessica A. Clarke points out that many of the institutions that have fired men
in leadership positions in the wake of the #MeToo movement have used it as an opportunity to
consider and increase gender diversity. Clarke, supra note 3, at 13. “[O]f [the] 201 male leaders
who lost their positions due to sexual harassment, almost half were replaced by women.” Id.
238. See U.S. EEOC, supra note 8, at 31.
239. Id. at 35; see also McCann & Tomaskovic-Devey, supra note 5 (stating that harassment
claims are “better addressed by managers treating harassment claims as managerial
responsibilities, rather than outsourcing them as strictly legal problems. Past research suggests
that the most effective [method] to ending . . . harassment . . . [is] getting managers to take
ownership of the problem”).
240. Hébert, supra note 16, at 734–36.
241. Cf. id. at 736 (stating that most actual victims do not behave the way that research
participants say they would behave). For a discussion about how real victims tend to behave
differently than the way that the public thinks that they would, see sources cited supra note 148.
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plaintiff must meet for the court to award her punitive damages. Right
now, employers can avoid punitive damages if they “engage in good-faith
efforts to comply with Title VII.”242 Courts have held that training (even
compliance-focused training that may or may not be effective) can allow
employers to avoid punitive damages.243 Of course, plaintiffs will critique
this aspect of this Article’s proposal. But reform is often about
compromise.244 And allowing plaintiffs to survive summary judgment in
cases where they often would have had their claims dismissed at the
summary judgment stage is a fairly big win for them. As most
employment attorneys know, getting past summary judgment
dramatically increases the settlement potential of claims.245
B. Relationship-Based Harms as Adverse Employment Actions246
The second part of the proposed reform is for courts to recognize
relationship-based harms as adverse employment actions under the
retaliation doctrine.247 Right now, courts almost universally hold that
when reporters of harassment or discrimination are shunned or ostracized
in the workplace, they did not experience an adverse employment

242. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 546 (1999) (quoting Kolstad v. Am.
Dental Ass’n, 139 F.3d 958, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Tatel, J., dissenting), vacated, 527 U.S. 526
(1999)).
243. See Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention, supra note 41, at 11.
244. See, e.g., Nicole B. Porter, The Perfect Compromise: Bridging the Gap Between At-Will
Employment and Just Cause, 87 NEB. L. REV. 62, 108 (2008).
245. Nicole Buonocore Porter, Disabling ADA Retaliation Claims, 19 NEV. L.J. 823, 836
(2019).
246. The Author needs to acknowledge another hurdle to the proposal and to retaliation
claims more generally. In addition to the three elements discussed above, see supra Section I.C.
(stating that plaintiffs must demonstrate: (1) protected activity; (2) adverse employment action;
and (3) causation), some courts will also make it difficult for a plaintiff to bring a retaliation claim
if the retaliation was at the hands of a coworker rather than a supervisor, see supra Section I.B.
As discussed in detail in her article, Professor Brake notes that there is currently a circuit split
regarding whether and when employers should be held liable for retaliation by coworkers. See
Brake, supra note 5, at 11–31 (discussing the circuit split). Thus, in some circuits, even if this
Article’s proposal to classify relationship-based harms as adverse employment actions under the
retaliation doctrine were successful, there would be an additional hurdle if the relationship-based
harm (shunning, etc.) was coming from coworkers rather than supervisors. This is obviously a
real impediment to the potential success of the proposal but because this Article also deals with
relationship-based harms between employees and supervisors (and not just coworker retaliation),
it leaves a more robust discussion of the issue identified by Professor Brake for another day.
247. As recognized by Professor Brake, the promise of the #MeToo movement “is more
dependent on the law of retaliation than the scope of sexual harassment law.” Brake, supra note
5, at 6. I made a similar argument in my prior work. See Porter, supra note 1, at 58 (having the
title Ending Harassment by Starting with Retaliation and arguing that ending harassment must
start with preventing retaliation).
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action.248 The reasoning of these courts is that reasonable people would
not be deterred from reporting if they knew that they would experience
relationship-based harms in the workplace.249 And yet, most of the
empirical evidence tells us that the opposite is true—that employees
(sometimes men, but especially women) often do avoid reporting because
of fear of ruining their workplace relationships and sometimes even
because they care enough about their harasser that they do not want to get
that person in trouble.250
There have been many calls for strengthening the protection against
retaliation more broadly.251 This proposal is specific in that it is only
addressing the second element of the prima facie case, whether the
plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action. Reforming this element
could be accomplished in a couple of different ways. The standard for
proving an adverse employment action could be broadened for all types
of actions, such as disciplines, transfers to undesirable positions, etc.252
Or it could simply be specified that relationship-based harms would count
as adverse employment actions. This would mean that being shunned or
ostracized in the workplace—having coworkers or your supervisor ignore
you, slam doors in your face, noticeably talk behind your back, etc.—
would constitute adverse employment actions. To be clear, there are
compelling arguments to be made in favor of reform efforts that would

248. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
249. Brake, supra note 5, at 33 (noting that courts minimize the deterrent effect of actions
such as shunning and ostracizing); Grossman, supra note 7, at 1046 (“[T]he implication of
Burlington Northern and its progeny is that reasonable employees are ‘resilient, self-sufficient,
and willing to risk the loss of congenial relationships at work in exchange for the assertion of civil
rights.’” (quoting Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a RightsClaiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 907 (2008))).
250. See Brake, supra note 5, at 34; supra Section II.A.1.
251. See Porter, supra note 246, at 852–54 (arguing for changes to all three elements of the
prima facie retaliation claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act); Porter, supra note 1, at
56–57 (arguing for changes to all three elements of the prima facie retaliation claim in harassment
cases); Schultz, supra note 7, at 38 (arguing that protection against retaliation for victims of
harassment must be strengthened because “[h]arassment can be eliminated only if people who are
harassed are safe in coming forward”); Sperino, supra note 87, at 2069 (arguing for a broader
standard for determining adverse employment action); see also Brake, supra note 20, at 102–03
(arguing for a new retaliation standard); Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in an EEO World, 89 IND.
L.J. 115, 165–69 (2014) (recommending two fixes to the retaliation doctrine).
252. See Porter, supra note 1, at 55 (arguing that the narrow standard for adverse
employment action “does not comport with reality”); Schultz, supra note 7, at 41 (stating that the
adverse employment action should be broadly defined); Sperino, supra note 87, at 2069 (arguing
for a standard where anything more than de minimis harm is protected).
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more generally broaden the definition of adverse employment action,253
but that reform is beyond the scope and purpose of this Article.
Similar to the proposal regarding delays in reporting, this reform
would allow the plaintiff to survive summary judgment on her retaliation
claim if she suffered relationship-based harms. Just as judges have proven
themselves incapable of understanding why women might avoid
reporting harassment, they are perhaps even more incapable of imagining
what would “dissuade a reasonable worker”254 from reporting harassment
or discrimination. As I have previously argued elsewhere, “federal
judges, who have lifetime job security, are less likely to feel threatened
or deterred by actions that would deter a reasonable worker, who does not
enjoy such job security.”255
The major criticism to this proposal would likely take the form of the
following question: how do employers control the actions of their
employees, especially when those employees are not supervisors?256 In
other words, although society might expect an employer to be liable for
the retaliatory actions of its supervisors (such as terminations and
demotions), can society expect employers to be able to stop their
employees from shunning or ostracizing those who report harassment in
the workplace?257 And perhaps even more fundamentally, how would the
employers even know this was happening?258
The answer is similar to the response above: it is all about changing
the workplace culture. In this case, it is about celebrating a culture of
reporting rather than punishing reporting.259
253. See Porter, supra note 246, at 852–54; Porter, supra note 1, at 54–55. As noted by one
scholar, most employees consider a broad range of actions to be retaliatory, even things that
merely cause discomfort. Walker, supra note 18, at 21.
254. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006).
255. Porter, supra note 1, at 55. But see Brake, supra note 5, at 40–41 (discussing a recent
case, Minarsky v. Susquehanna Cty., 895 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2018), where the court acknowledged
the difficulty of speaking up about harassment).
256. For instance, this issue arose in Rennard v. Woodworker’s Supply, Inc., where the court
noted that the plaintiff was shunned by her coworkers, but the court held that, although coworker
retaliatory harassment can sometimes constitute an adverse employment action, it only will if
management either orchestrated the harassment or knew about it and acquiesced in it, and there
was no evidence of that occurring here. 101 F. App’x 296, 308 (10th Cir. 2004).
257. The importance of accomplishing this cannot be overstated. As Professor Brake has
noted, coworkers’ reactions to reports of harassment are really important. Brake, supra note 5, at
7. “[A] lack of coworker support can make employees more vulnerable to harassment . . . .” Id. at
7–8. Moreover, “coworkers can be an equally powerful force in establishing cultures of silence
and discrimination.” Id. at 8. If coworkers side with the harasser, they might exclude the victim
from key informal networks that are important to job success. Id.
258. See id. at 18 (noting that the Tenth Circuit requires actual knowledge of the retaliation).
259. See Bingham & Scherer, supra note 14, at 245 (hypothesizing that power, gender, and
perceived work climate are associated with employees’ responses to sexual harassment and their
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However, as some scholars have noted, most employers do not
actually want to encourage complaints.260 In fact, many employers often
react to complaints with “aggressive attacks on those who complain,”
which are “designed to isolate the charging party and to send a message
to other workers that the cost of pursuing legal remedies to discrimination
will be prohibitively high.”261
And as another scholar has stated, “[c]reating a work environment in
which
employees . . . feel
comfortable
reporting
suspected
misconduct . . . is something that . . . few[] companies have managed to
do [well].”262 This is not surprising because most people have
internalized a message of not wanting to be a “snitch.”263 And even minor
retaliation “can have a deleterious impact on reporting procedures.”264
Thus, as other scholars have argued, managers should be trained to
eliminate all forms of retaliation, even the more subtle retaliation,
because it can have a detrimental impact on the willingness of employees
to come forward about harassment or discrimination.265 “[Reporting]
should be viewed as an attempt to improve the organization . . . not as a
betrayal or something to be punished.”266 Companies should create a
climate where victims do not fear reporting.267 Organizations need to
support whistleblowers by minimizing retaliation against those who
report.268
As stated by one scholar: “When training management, it is also
helpful to let them know that it is natural to feel angry, fearful or
defensive toward an employee who accuses them of unlawful conduct.
However, they should be reminded that showing anger or acting upon
it . . . may give rise to a retaliation claim.”269
satisfaction with the outcome of sexual harassment situations). One scholar has suggested that
employers implement a multitiered reporting system that would allow employees to report
confidentially or anonymously. Tuerkheimer, supra note 2, at 1191–92. She suggests that such a
system would signal to employees that the employer is interested in receiving complaints and will
act upon them (even the anonymous ones) whenever possible. Id. at 1205.
260. Grossman, supra note 9, at 14.
261. McCann & Tomaskovic-Devey, supra note 5.
262. Walker, supra note 18, at 19. In fact, because most employers do not like complaints of
discrimination or harassment, retaliation or the threat of retaliation might be viewed by employers
as an important means of discouraging complaints. See Bodensteiner, supra note 7, at 39.
263. Walker, supra note 18, at 19.
264. Id. at 23.
265. See id.
266. Bergman et al., supra note 19, at 230 (quoting Robert J. Paul & James B. Townsend,
Don’t Kill the Messenger! Whistle-Blowing in America—A Review with Recommendations, 9
EMP. RESPS. & RTS. J. 149, 157 (1996)).
267. See id. at 241.
268. See id. at 232.
269. Walker, supra note 18, at 23 (quoting Greg J. Richardson, Whistleblowing and Other
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How employers address harassment can also affect the likelihood of
retaliation.270 To punish harassers in a way that avoids them striking back,
employers should “discipline” but not “demean” because “[h]uman
nature suggests that one who feels demeaned, embarrassed, or unfairly
treated is more likely to contest the adverse action than is one who feels
respected.”271 The EEOC also suggests making sure penalties for
harassment are proportional to the offense; “zero tolerance” policies may
contribute to underreporting of harassment in part because employees
may not want to get an employee fired for what might be a relatively
minor infraction.272
Furthermore, the culture change discussed earlier must include
protection against retaliation. As recommended in the EEOC Task Force
Report, employers need to give “[c]lear assurance that employees who
make complaints” (and those who support other employees who have
made complaints) “will be protected against retaliation.”273 If this is not
happening, and employees are experiencing retaliation when they report,
their coworkers will think twice before reporting.274 Therefore, the
company’s established reporting system must provide a “supportive
environment where employees feel safe to express their views and do not
experience retribution.”275 Once an employee reports, there should be a
procedure in place that not only avoids management retaliating in a direct
way (e.g., termination, failure to promote, etc.) but also identifies other,
more subtle types of retaliation.276 Not allowing employers to win
summary judgment in retaliation cases will hopefully provide them the
incentive to change their workplace cultures to encourage reporting, so
that employees feel safe in coming forward.
CONCLUSION
The #MeToo movement has made a great deal of progress bringing
attention to the problems of harassment in the workplace.277 But
compared to the Hollywood victims that began the current version of this
movement in late 2017, most workers do not feel nearly as comfortable
reporting harassment. This is because the average worker fears the
workplace consequences that can come from complaining about the
Retaliation Claims, 762 PLI/LIT 869, 916 (2007)).
270. See, e.g., Bergman et al., supra note 19, at 232.
271. Bodensteiner, supra note 7, at 43.
272. U.S. EEOC, supra note 8, at 40.
273. Id. at 38.
274. Id. at 40.
275. Id. at 42.
276. See id. at 67.
277. See Porter, supra note 1, at 49. But cf. Brake, supra note 5, at 53–58 (stating that it is
uncertain whether the #MeToo movement will actually help or hurt the state of the law).
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actions of another employee, whether that other employee is a coworker
or a supervisor. Often that fear is not about being fired (although it
certainly sometimes is) but is instead about the more subtle types of
retaliation, such as being ignored, shunned, or humiliated, that can make
being at work uncomfortable or even unbearable. This Article has
established that women often care about harming their workplace
relationships. Thus, this Article has argued in favor of reforms that would
provide more protection to those employees who fear or experience
relationship-based harms in the workplace, similar to the fears Nina had
in the story that began this Article. The Author is certainly not naïve
enough to believe that this reform proposal is feasible in today’s political
climate and also does not believe it would be an immediate panacea to
the very large problem of harassment in the workplace. But as stated by
Professor Vicki Schultz, although law alone cannot create change,
“change rarely occurs without the law.”278

278. Schultz, supra note 7, at 17.
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